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viewed	as	acting	as	constraints	on	particular	Hamiltonians	and	their	associated	specific	laws.			 What	symmetries	are	we	talking	about?	Well,	first	of	all	there	is	the	Permutation	Invariance	that	arises	from	the	so-called	indistinguishability	of	quantum	particles	(see	French	and	Krause	2006).	As	a	constraint	it	effectively	divides	up	the	Hilbert	space	into	non-combining	sectors,	each	corresponding	to	a	particular	irreducible	representation	of	the	permutation	group	and	thus	to	a	certain	kind	of	particle	and	yielding	a	particular	form	of	quantum	statistics,	the	two	most	well	known	being	fermions,	which	obey	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	and	bosons,	obeying	Bose-Einstein	statistics.		 Secondly,	the	underlying	quantum	theory	of	the	Standard	Model	is,	of	course,	quantum	field	theory,	so	the	second	set	of	symmetries	that	needs	to	be	considered	are	those	of	Minkowski	space-time	–	the	space-time	of	Special	Relativity.	These	are	captured	by	the	Poincaré	group	and	the	irreducible	representations	of	this	group	yield	a	classification	of	all	elementary	particles,	with	these	representations	indexed	or	characterised	by	mass	and	spin	(the	invariants	of	the	group).			 Finally,	the	Standard	Model	(SM)	itself	is	fundamentally	a	gauge	theory,	represented	by	the	group	SU(3)	x	SU(2)	x	U(1)	via	which	the	relevant	symmetries	can	be	captured	within	the	theory.	That	the	SM	is	a	gauge	theory	refers	to	the	way	in	which	the	Lagrangian	of	a	system	–	which	basically	captures	the	dynamics	of	that	system	–	remains	invariant	under	a	group	of	transformations,	where	the	‘gauge’	denotes	certain	redundant	degrees	of	freedom	of	that	Lagrangian.	The	generator	of	the	group	of	transformations	represents	a	field	and	when	such	a	field	is	quantised,	we	get	the	so-called	gauge	bosons.	Thus,	consider	electrodynamics,	for	example:	the	relevant	gauge	symmetry	group	associated	with	the	property	of	charge	is	labelled	U(1)	and	the	gauge	boson	that	effectively	drops	out	of	the	requirement	of	gauge	invariance	is	the	familiar	photon.	This	requirement	can	then	be	extended	to	the	other	forces	in	physics	and	so,	for	the	weak	nuclear	force,	we	have	the	SU(2)	symmetry	group	associated	with	isospin,	a	property	of	protons	and	neutrons,	and	the	strong	nuclear	force	associated	with	SU(3)	which	operates	on	the	colour	property	of	quarks.	With	the	Higgs	boson	associated	with	the	breaking	of	the	isospin	symmetry	of	the	unified	electro-weak	force	and	responsible	for	the	acquisition	of	mass,	we	have	a	complete	picture	of	the	fundamental	forces,	gravity	excepting	of	course.			 So,	we	have	the	‘internal’	gauge	symmetries,	the	‘external’	space-time	symmetries	and	Permutation	symmetry.	And	the	blunt	question	for	the	dispositionalist	is:	how	are	you	going	to	accommodate	them?	Frankly,	I	do	not	think	she	can	(for	similar	sentiments,	see	Psillos	1996;	Lange	2012;	and	for	further	discussion	in	this	specific	context	see	Cei	and	French	2014,	French	2014).	Consider	the	S&M	characterisation	above:	how	might	this	accommodate	the	afore-mentioned	symmetry	principles?	It	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	that	it	is	in	response	to	a	certain	kind	of	stimulus	that	a	quantum	particle	manifests	fermionic	or	bosonic	behaviour,	or	cannot	accelerate	past	the	speed	of	light	or	has	its	interactions	governed	by	the	SU(3)	symmetry,	say.	Indeed,	dispositionalists	themselves	seem	to	appreciate	the	difficulty	in	which	they	find	themselves,	with	Bird,	for	example,	suggesting	that	these	symmetries	should	be	dismissed	as	mere	‘pseudo-laws’	that	will	eventually	be	eliminated	from	physics.	
	 One	might	be	tempted	to	shift	to	an	alternative	account,	such	as	the	so-called	‘Humean’	picture.	According	to	this,	the	underlying	metaphysics	is	that	of	a	‘mosaic’	of	properties	(the	so-called	‘perfectly	natural’	ones)	instantiated	at	space-time	points.	This	mosaic	exhibits	certain	regularities	and	those	that	we	represent	via	our	‘best’	system	are	deemed	to	be	laws	(see	Cohen	and	Callender	2009).	However,	little,	if	anything,	has	been	said	on	how	the	Humean	might	accommodate	the	above	symmetry	principles.			 Here	a	dilemma	arises	(see	Hall	2015)	:	first,	this	combination,	of	the	Humean	mosaic	with	its	regularities,	and	a	‘best	system	account’	of	laws	(plus	symmetries)	just	does	not	mesh	nicely	with	the	practice	of	physics.	In	particular,	that	practice	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	what	can	be	called	the	‘Dynamical	Hypothesis’	(DH)	and	the	‘Initial	Conditions	Hypothesis’	(ICH),	into	which	the	nomologically	possible	histories	of	particle	behaviour	are	factored	by	the	fundamental	laws	(ibid.).	Our	system	will	then	be	better	to	the	extent	that	the	latter	is	as	uninformative	as	possible,	in	the	sense	that	it	should	admit	as	broad	a	range	of	initial	conditions	as	nomologically	permitted,	whereas	the	former	should	be	as	informative	as	possible,	this	combination	yielding	the	maximum	explanatory	power.			 Unfortunately,	this	distinction	is	entirely	unmotivated	by	the	underlying	metaphysics	of	the	Humean	mosaic	(ibid.).	To	see	this,	consider	the	Humean	conception	of	law:	on	this	view,	a	claim	about	the	world	counts	as	law-like	only	if	it	can	be	regarded	as	a	‘distinctively	appropriate	target	for	scientific	inquiry’,	independent	of	its	nomological	status.	The	question	then	is,	how,	from	all	the	various	distributions	of	perfectly	natural	properties	spread	across	the	mosaic,	do	we	pick	out	those	that	count	as	‘distinctively	appropriate’?	Lewis,	famously,	argued	that	we	should	pick	out	those	that	meet	certain	standards	of	simplicity	and	informativeness,	but	the	latter,	is	precisely	not	what	we	want	when	it	comes	to	the	ICH.			 Thus,	the	Humean	faces	a	dilemma:	on	the	one	hand,	she	can	ensure	that	her	account	meshes	with	the	practice	of	physics	by	incorporating	the	ICH/DH	distinction,	but	then	the	choice	of	the	resulting	standards	(for	judging	what	is	a	law	etc.)	are	entirely	unmotivated	by	the	metaphysics	of	the	mosaic;	or	she	can	choose	standards	that	are	so	motivated,	but	then	her	account	will	be	out	of	kilter	with	scientific	practice.	As	Hall	puts	it,		‘This	choice	between	a	guilty	intellectual	conscience	and	insane	revisionism	is	not	a	happy	one.’	(ibid.,	p.	51).		 Bringing	symmetries	on	stage	renders	this	dilemma	even	more	acute.	The	practice	of	physics	suggests	that	symmetry	principles	should	be	regarded	as	further	constraints	on	the	DH:	in	the	relativistic	context,	for	example,	only	those	dynamical	hypotheses	are	allowed	that	conform	to	the	symmetries	represented	by	the	Poincaré	group;	in	the	context	of	quantum	mechanics,	only	those	Hamiltonians	will	be	considered	that	commute	with	the	particle	permutation	operator.	Thus,	in	addition	to	those	restrictions	on	the	ICH	that	would	allow	us,	for	example,	to	construct	a	mathematically	acceptable	DH	to	begin	with,	we	have	the	further	restrictions	imposed	on	the	DH	by	the	relevant	symmetries.	Again,	we	face	the	issue	of	how	these	restrictions	might	be	motivated	by	the	metaphysics	of	the	mosaic.		 The	Humean	could	argue	that	we	should	consider	the	nature	of	physics	practice	more	carefully.	Of	course,	it	would	be	hard	to	deny	that	such	symmetry	principles	do	play	a	heuristic	role	in	theory	construction	but	this	does	not	mean	
that	they	should	be	understood	as	constraining	the	DH	in	the	way	that	the	ICH	does.	Indeed,	the	Humean	can	simply	insist	that	these	symmetries	reflect	meta-level	regularities	that	hold	between	the	law-like	regularities	across	the	mosaic.	Thus,	the	Poincaré	symmetries	are	just	meta-level	features	of	the	laws	of	Special	Relativity	and	Permutation	Symmetry	can	be	understood	as	a	manifestation	of	the	peculiar	nature	of	the	entities	of	which	the	mosaic	is	composed	(French	and	Krause	2006).			 On	this	view,	then,	there	are	no	constraints,	strictly	speaking,	And	to	suggest	that	the	only	alternative	is	to	regard	these	principles	as	‘mere’	coincidences,	would	be	to	miss	the	point:	as	far	as	the	Humean	is	concerned,	that	the	mosaic	displays	certain	regularities	and	that	these	regularities	display	certain	similarities	themselves,	is	just	a	fact	of	the	way	the	world	is.	Of	course,	the	accompanying	‘best	system	account’	must	be	further	extended	to	include	these	symmetries	as	also	part	of	the	‘system’	but	now	Hall’s	dilemma	bites	again.		 One	might	think	that	there	is	nothing	in	principle	preventing	such	an	extension:	those	meta-regularities	that	meet	whatever	criteria	are	deployed	to	evaluate	which	system	is	‘the	best’	are	deemed	to	be	the	symmetry	principles.	However,	on	the	very	basis	just	set	out,	a	claim	about	the	world	counts	as	a	‘meta-regularity’,	in	this	sense,	only	if	it	too	can	be	regarded	as	a	‘distinctively	appropriate	target	for	scientific	inquiry’,	independently	of	its	meta-law-like	status.	But	what	criteria	do	we	use	for	determining	which	of	the	various	meta-regularities	spread	across	the	mosaic	are	deemed	to	be	‘distinctively	appropriate’	in	this	sense?	Granted,	since	we	are	reconstruing	scientific	practice	in	accordance	with	this	response,	we	don’t	have	to	worry	about	accommodating	the	way	physics	views	the	ICH/DH	distinction,	and	so	the	Humean	might,	for	example,	revert	to	the	kind	of	traditional	criteria	that	Hall	dismissed	as	failing	to	mesh	with	that	practice;	criteria	such	as	‘informativeness’	or	explanatory	power.	But	the	extent	to	which	symmetry	principles	might	be	taken	to	possess	such	power	is	only	just	being	explored	and	certainly	further	work	needs	to	be	undertaken	before	pursuing	this	line.		 Hall	concludes	his	analysis	by	asking	what	metaphysical	viewpoint	might	motivate	the	kind	of	distinction	he	has	set	out	between	the	ICH	and	the	DH	and	suggests	that	it	must	be	the	kind	of	view	that	takes	information	about	the	counterfactual	structure	of	the	world	to	be	sui	generis	(Hall	ibid.,	p.52).	With	dispositionalism	ruled	out	by	contemporary	physics,	what	other	view	can	meet	this	demand?		
New	Tools	from	the	Toolbox	There	are	in	fact	a	number	of	recent	analyses	that	one	might	deploy	here,	some	of	which	are	extensions	or	variants	of	the	dispositionalist	framework,	others	of	which	are	quite	different	(French	forthcoming).	Here	is	one	such:	Vetter’s	account	of	potentiality	(Vetter	2015).			 She	begins	by	noting	that	the	conditional	analysis	that	lies	behind	the	S&M	characterisation	of	dispositionality	lies	in	tension	with	our	linguistic	means	by	which	we	ascribe	dispositions,	via	adjectives	such	as	‘fragile’,	‘irascible’,	or	‘soluble’.	As	she	notes,	these	all	refer	to	only	one	half	of	the	putative	conditional,	namely	the	relevant	manifestation	in	each	case.	Furthermore,	she	argues,	the	most	natural	way	of	paraphrasing	for	the	–le	suffix	through	which	they	are	
formed	is	‘can’	and	other	expressions	of	possibility.	This	motivates	her	account,	which	characterises	the	relevant	modality	via	a	form	of	possibility.			 More	particularly,	such	a	possibility	is	a	potentiality	of	some	object,	where	this	is	individuated	by	its	manifestation.	Thus	we	drop	the	stimulus	and	with	it,	the	S&M	characterisation.	The	modal	nature	of	the	possibility	is	then	best	expressed	simply	by	‘x	can	M’		and	the	difference	with	the	dispositional	account	can	be	seen	if	we	consider	the	context-dependence	and	vagueness	of	terms	such	as	‘fragile’.	This	context	dependence	comes	down	to	the	degrees	of	fragility,	in	the	sense	that	whether	something	–	a	vase,	say	–	counts	as	fragile	in	a	given	context	has	to	do	with	how	fragile	it	is.	The	dispositionalist	will	accommodate	that	dependence	in	terms	of	a	property	that	comes	in	degrees,	some	of	which	will	be	sufficient	for	the	correct	application	of	‘is	fragile’.		For	Vetter,	by	contrast,	being	fragile	is	a	matter	of	having	the	right	potentiality	to	a	contextually	sufficient	degree	(ibid.,	pp.	21-22).			 Of	course,	we	lose	the	counterfactual	analysis	underpinning	the	standard	dispositionalist	account,	and	we	lose	the	tight	connection	with	causation.	But	then,	of	course,	the	latter	is	a	problem	when	it	comes	to	the	foundations	of	physics.	We	also	lose	the	explanatory	value	of	dispositionalism	in	accounting	for	the	modal	necessity	of	laws	but	Vetter	argues	that	this	was	always	illusory,	since	all	that	the	S&M	characterisation	gives	us	is	a	conjunction	of	law	instances,	rather	than	the	law	per	se	(Vetter	2009).			 On	her	view,	it	is	potentialities	‘all	the	way	down’,	so	that	the	fundamental	properties	are	potentialities,	possessed,	due	to	their	fundamentality,	to	the	maximum	degree	(2015,	p.	285).	Taking	classical	physics,	on	this	view	objects	that	have	charge	have	the	potentiality	(to	maximal	degree)	to	exert	a	force	whose	value	is	related	to	that	of	other	charges	and	their	distance	from	that	object	through	Coulomb’s	Law	(ibid.).	This	leaves	open	questions	about	the	modal	status	of	such	laws,	in	the	sense	that	their	necessity	or	otherwise	does	not	simply	follow	from	the	modal	metaphysics	of	potentiality		(ibid.,	pp.	288-290).	This	might	seem	like	a	significant	loss	of	metaphysical	explanatory	power	but,	again,	this	was	never	really	there	to	begin	with	and	as	we	have	seen,	cannot	be	obtained	anyway	when	it	comes	to	the	symmetries.	So,	perhaps	we	can	turn	this	to	our	advantage	and	use	Vetter’s	account	to	capture	the	modal	aspects	of	the	Standard	Model.		 Of	course,	we	do	not	have	the	equivalent	in	the	language	of	physics	of	adjectives	such	as	fragile;	we	do	not	(typically)	refer	to	electrons	as	‘spinnable’,	for	example!	However	we	do	have	something	similar,	namely	the	language	of	mathematics,	in	which	modern	physics	is	expressed	(suitably	interpreted	of	course).	It	is	this	that	reveals	the	possibilities	inherent	in	the	particular	symmetry	we	might	be	concerned	with.	Thus,	consider	again	Permutation	Symmetry:	if	one	reads	the	standard	range	of	textbooks	in	quantum	physics,	one	will	find	statements	to	the	effect	that	the	wave	functions	of	quantum	systems	must	be	either	symmetrical	or	anti-symmetrical,	corresponding	to	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics,	resepctively.	But	as	was	recognised	early	on,	and	as	was	made	explicit	in	the	late	1950s	and	1960s	(for	a	history	of	such	developments,	see	French	and	Krause	2006)	,	the	mathematics	of	the	more	general	Permutation	Invariance	contains	a	whole	range	of	other	possible	
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